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POSTINDUSTRIAL ELITE AND NON-ELITE 
INSECURITIES
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ABSTRACT Two growing conflicts, peculiar to postindustrial societies, challenge 
the ability of elites to keep postindustrial politics manageable. These are (1) a 
conflict between elites and those non-elites who remain reasonably well integrated 
in the productive and social orders of postindustrial societies but who feel 
themselves vulnerable to elite personnel decisions they regard as arbitrary and 
uninformed – ‘insiders’; (2) a conflict between insiders and the many persons 
in postindustrial societies who are more or less unemployable for objective or 
subjective reasons and located in strictly marginal or wholly superfluous work 
and dependency statuses – ‘outsiders’. Both conflicts impede the managerial roles 
of elites and raise questions about how postindustrial societies can be sustained 
without suffering organizational paralysis and the socioeconomic retrogression 
that would accompany it.   
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A society becomes postindustrial when 40 percent of its workforce is 
employed in bureaucratic and service work, a proportion that increases 
quite rapidly to 70-75, even 80 percent (cf. Bell 1999: xv). By the 1950s the 
composition of workforces in the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, 
Denmark, Sweden, and Canada had reached the 40 percent threshold to 
postindustrial conditions, and during the succeeding two or three decades 
virtually all other Western countries, plus Japan, crossed it. Quite unforeseen 
by nearly all observers at the time, non-elites in the first postindustrial societies 
began to divide into two loose interest and attitude camps during the 1960s 
and 1970s. The camps’ boundaries were not contiguous with those of the 
classes and strata that derived from the agricultural, manual industrial and non-
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manual workforce components so prominent during historical socioeconomic 
development. One camp, which it is convenient to label ‘insiders’, consists 
of all the persons more or less securely and satisfactorily employed in the 
workforces of postindustrial countries, plus the many persons in comfortable 
and honorific statuses as dependents of these employees. More specifically, 
the insider camp contains: (1) the bulk of non-manual bureaucratic and service 
workers, especially those holding relatively interesting and responsible jobs 
as middle- and upper-level managers, professionals and their assistants, as 
well as specialists in many services; (2) reasonably prosperous farmers and 
artisans; (3) skilled manual industrial workers holding decently paid jobs 
that are usually protected by strong trade unions; (4) persons in more or 
less honorific statuses such as better-off retired persons and persons directly 
dependent on the foregoing categories of workers, such as spouses, children, 
offspring in educational institutions, and elderly parents.   
The other camp, ‘outsiders’, contains two non-elite segments with distinctly 
different social experiences, and this difference tends to prevent them from 
acting as a single and self-conscious political force. One segment encompasses 
people in conditions of poverty who are largely outside the dominant cultures 
of postindustrial societies, together with an indeterminate number of people 
suffering severe personal handicaps of a physical or emotional kind. Most 
of these people are without marketable work skills or, at least, without the 
attitudes necessary for regular employment in organizationally complex 
and technologically sophisticated work environments. Employers find it 
uneconomic to pay many of these persons a living wage for the relatively few 
kinds of work they may be able and willing to undertake, and there is, in any 
case, no pressing need for such work. 
The second segment of outsiders encompasses many persons who experience 
what are essentially leisure-class upbringings. Although there is probably a 
tendency in any urban setting to treat children as luxury items to be pampered and 
displayed, a steady decline in available jobs for teenagers in postindustrial cities 
reinforces this urban tendency. Parental incomes are high enough so that idleness 
and boredom do not become serious problems for these young people until their 
later teenage years. During their childhoods and much of their adolescence 
they engage in pleasurable activities provided by parents, schools, and a wide 
variety of sport, hobby, and other organizations. Although many leisured young 
people manage to find part-time employment for short periods, the income they 
earn is used mainly to purchase fashionable goods, their own automobiles, and 
entertainments. Typically, this part-time employment is not seriously time-
consuming, nor is it necessary in any urgent way. To a considerable degree, it is a 
distraction from idleness and boredom.
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Most of the activities in which these leisured youth engage have no serious 
ulterior purpose, except possibly an educational one. Their activities cannot 
be related plausibly to the needs of other people or to society as a whole. 
Engaging in them does not involve accommodating seriously inconvenient 
wishes of adults or practicing much self-discipline by, for example, deferring 
immediate gratifications. Because their leisured circumstances are generally 
comfortable and entertaining, comparatively few leisured young people 
develop substantial personal ambitions. Unlike the great bulk of young people 
in all previous societies, they have no strong urge to reach adulthood. Just as it 
was always difficult historically to instill provident and responsible behavior 
among the indulged offspring of aristocrats and other wealthy families, so it is 
difficult to teach prudent standards of adult behavior to leisured young people 
in postindustrial societies. 
It is ironic that the pleasant and more or less absorbing activities of these 
young people create problems of adjustment later in life, but there is a good 
deal of evidence that this is so. One reason is that the affluence enjoyed by most 
leisured young people proves to be quite limited. It depends almost entirely 
on parents’ incomes. Although those incomes are far above historical levels, 
they are nevertheless tied to the holding of specific occupational positions. 
Relatively few parents have extensive property holdings or other accumulated 
wealth that can be passed on to their offspring. Once the parents retire or die, 
their offspring have little prospect of leading adult lives that will in any major 
way be as leisured as the upbringings they have experienced. Accordingly, 
life’s prospects increasingly look fairly grim to many leisured adolescents as 
they approach and reach adulthood.  
Except for the relative few who emerge from their upbringings with 
exceptional ambition, leisured youth tend to face adult life with resignation, 
and not a few want to evade its responsibilities to the extent they can. Needless 
to say, young adults with this outlook are nearly as unemployable as those with 
outlooks shaped in deprivation and poverty. Just as there is little need for the 
kind of routine work the latter can perform, so there is little need to employ 
immature, inexperienced, and unenthusiastic young adults in bureaucratic 
and service positions. Thus, although their backgrounds and social locations 
differ dramatically, persons in the two outsider segments have in common an 
inability or reluctance to participate fully in the workforces, labor markets, 
and occupational career structures of postindustrial societies. Taken as a single 
collectivity, then, outsiders consist of: (1) unemployed persons; (2) persons 
precariously employed in less desirable jobs or in ‘make-work’ jobs openly 
created to absorb them into the workforce; (3) persons who manage in one or 
another way, because of some obvious or at least plausible incapacity, to be 
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supported in meager and non-honorific statuses by society or by individual 
benefactors; and (4) dependents and hangers-on of all these persons. 
The proportion of non-elites in postindustrial societies that outsiders 
comprise appears to increase with the length of time a society has a 
postindustrial work force configuration. In societies that came somewhat 
later to post-industrialism – Australia, France, northern Italy, New Zealand, 
Switzerland, Spain, West Germany – outsiders became conspicuous mainly 
during the 1980s. But they were quite visible a decade or two before that in 
the initial postindustrial societies, most especially the United States, Great 
Britain, and the Netherlands, in all three of which racial features accentuated 
the distinctiveness of many outsiders. The emergence of insider and outsider 
camps is a principal consequence of post-industrialism. As was the case with 
workforce components and the classes and strata based on them in previous 
stages of socioeconomic development, it is the relations between these non-
elite camps and between them and elites that are important sources of social 
and political conflict in postindustrial societies. 
RELATIONS BETWEEN ELITES AND INSIDERS
The interdependent decision-making that most work in postindustrial societies 
entails contributes to a greater understanding and acceptance of the necessity 
for power exercises by socially remote persons than is the case in industrial 
and pre-industrial societies. This is because the daily work experiences of 
by far the largest segment of workers – non-manual bureaucratic and service 
personnel – involve more or less constant and instrumental manipulations of 
social strangers in extended and impersonal organizational hierarchies and 
in interactions between service providers and their socially distant clients 
and customers. With at least one bureaucratic or service worker located in 
most nuclear families, a ‘managerial’ orientation that tends to regard power 
exercises as necessary means for the regular and efficient performance of 
work tasks pervades the insider camp, and in spite of the different categories 
of workers and dependents this camp contains (Field – Higley 1980: 26-27). 
As a result, the dominant culture displays a more sophisticated understanding 
of organizational imperatives. There is tacit recognition that elites, like less 
strategically placed power wielders, manipulate the behavior of other persons 
in order to make large and impersonal bureaucratic and service endeavors 
possible. Moreover, insiders tend to view these endeavors as essential to 
the attained level of affluence and productivity, whether the endeavors are 
humanly satisfying or not. 
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But this widespread if tacit understanding of the need for elites does not 
necessarily lead to an equally widespread acceptance of the roles, statuses, 
and behaviors of current elites or specific elite persons. Many insiders can 
generally acknowledge the necessity for organizational hierarchies and for 
elites to head them up and yet still suppose that the manipulation of personal 
conduct for organizational ends might be better – that is, more humanely, more 
wisely – done by persons other than those who currently have elite status. 
Similarly, many can regard proposals for altering the ways in which elites 
obtain and exercise power as desirable and plausible: choosing elites more 
democratically; insisting on shorter elite tenures; requiring that elite decision-
making be more transparent, and so on. In addition, the recrudescence of 
populism in all postindustrial societies during recent decades inclines many 
insiders to entertain reforms that would enable major organizational decisions 
to be taken by organizational participants themselves. In many universities, 
notably in Europe, such reforms have been implemented to a considerable 
extent, as have variants of the German ‘co-determination’ scheme that pays 
more than lip service to participatory decision-making in business firms and 
government agencies. However, most large organizations in postindustrial 
societies are subject to private property rights or the constitutionally specified 
rights of superior political authorities, and these limit the extent to which 
decision-making can be made more participative. 
Because of these limits, and because the necessity for organizational hierarchies 
headed up by elites is at least tacitly acknowledged, the discontent of many insiders 
with current elite persons and statuses has moved in an oblique direction. This is 
the widespread demand for procedural safeguards that allow the greatest possible 
‘input’ of interested opinion and sentiment into decision-making processes. In 
effect, insiders demand that these processes be formalized, even ‘judicialized’, 
so that although elites still make final decisions, their actual latitude of choice is 
slight. Universities are a locus for the formalization of organizational decision-
making, allowing non-academic staff and students to have inputs that are more 
or less co-equal with faculty inputs into decisions that are taken ultimately by top 
administrators, whose hands are tied significantly by the inputs. But because the 
bureaucratic and hierarchical structures of universities are puny compared with 
most other organizations, and because these structures are not indispensable to the 
primary university tasks of teaching and research, the formalization of decision-
making in universities is mostly just time-consuming and does not greatly affect 
how their primary tasks are performed. 
Where bureaucratic and hierarchical structures are more essential for the 
performance of primary tasks – in commercial firms, government agencies 
and many smaller service enterprises – the widespread encouragement of 
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committee decision-making accompanied by encounter-group exercises and 
techniques such as sensitivity training indicate a similar trend to restrict the 
decision-making latitude of elites. More importantly, in virtually all collective 
bargaining contexts, between labor and management as well as in relation to 
white-collar and professional employees, rules and regulations are adopted 
that severely formalize the hiring, firing, promotion, and task re-assignments 
of personnel. This is especially pronounced in decisions affecting workers 
who have seniority or tenure rights, but it extends to employees seeking 
those rights. The recent skirmish in France about whether employers should 
be allowed by law to terminate new and young employees before a legally 
mandated two-year probationary period of work is completed is but one 
example of the heated conflicts that swirl around these formalizations. 
If they continued unchecked, efforts to formalize and even judicialize 
organizational decision-making, making it more open and subject to pressures 
by affected personnel, would eventually more or less eliminate elite decision-
making and, thus, elite statuses. This is a prospect that is wholly peculiar 
to postindustrial societies. In all earlier societies the elimination or at least 
severe truncation of elite decision-making in organizational matters was 
literally impossible because most workforce members were insufficiently 
sophisticated about complex organizational functioning to be able to bring it 
about. In addition, the line-up of political forces in such societies guaranteed 
that experiments in this direction never got much of a trial. The possible 
exceptions were leveling revolutions in largely agricultural societies that 
involved full or partial destructions of existing elites. But as the French and 
Russian revolutions and their aftermaths showed, revolutionary eliminations 
of elites are brief, they trigger drastic declines in economic productivity 
and well being, and they are followed by prompt returns to organizational 
hierarchies headed up by new or restored elites who have more latitude for 
decision-making then was available to elites before the revolutions.  
It is not possible to be so categorical about the situation in postindustrial 
societies. The work experiences and numerical dominance of non-manual 
bureaucratic and service personnel provide much greater sophistication about 
organizational matters, and the trend toward formalizing elite decision-making, 
by now well advanced, has not as yet resulted in organizational disaster. The 
interesting question is how far postindustrial societies can proceed in this 
direction. Are major further steps ‘impossible’ in the less literal sense that 
bureaucratic organization would at some point become paralyzed so that 
resulting chaos would lead to economic retrogression or to an authoritarian 
restoration of wide elite decision-making latitude? The answer involves 
several issues in the theoretical understanding of elites.   
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Most major organizational decisions, even when they are not explicitly 
personnel decisions, have important implications for the careers of many 
organizational members. As regards such decisions, these members are 
vitally interested parties, and they cannot be expected to show restraint or 
impartiality in processes leading to the decisions. If anyone can be expected 
to judge more or less impartially in the interests of the organization (or the 
society), it is those whose own careers have already been successful enough 
so that further advancing their personal interests is not a pressing concern. 
Normally, such successful persons occupy the paramount or ‘elite’ positions 
in large organizations (Higley – Burton 2006:5-8). It is conceivable that in old-
fashioned bureaucratic and hierarchical structures, where there were virtually 
no formalized ‘inputs’ of the kinds organizations in postindustrial societies 
allow, major organizational decisions affecting the careers and lives of many 
personnel were made as prudently and responsibly as they ever can be.
The postindustrial trend toward formalization makes it unlikely that 
decisions generally acceptable to all or most organizational participants can 
be reached. The rival interests of persons vitally affected by these decisions 
stand in the way. Formalization makes these rivalries more public, and in so 
doing it exacerbates emotions and feelings that surround them. Reforms aimed 
at formalizing and opening up choices between rival interests are most likely 
to result in postponements, evasions, or compromises aimed at placating all 
interested parties. Furthermore, although the making of choices is usually 
necessary because of an organization’s limited resources, which choice to 
make is very often an arbitrary matter except from the selfish standpoint of 
the person(s) the choice benefits. For an elite decision-maker to make such 
choices privately, even if he or she simply flips a coin, is quite possibly less 
harmful in the long run than pretending publicly that a rational, defensible 
choice has been made impartially after a full airing of rival arguments and 
claims. 
These considerations imply that elites in postindustrial conditions must find 
ways to preserve the essence of their decision-making power and latitude. 
They must do this not merely to defend their own interests, but because if 
they allow themselves to become enmeshed by procedural safeguards and 
requirements of openness and transparency in making decisions, then intra-
organizational conflicts will be enflamed to a point where paralysis in one or 
another guise will set in. This would gravely impede the material productivity 
and political orderliness of postindustrial societies. It is important to 
underscore, however, that this is in no sense an argument for curtailing the 
functions of representative bodies, political parties, or electoral systems as 
they now operate in postindustrial societies. As observers of these institutions 
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frequently observe, they do not greatly restrict the influence and power of 
elites (see Borchert 2009; Körösényi 2009). They do, however, ensure that 
major questions are referred to forums that symbolize the public interest 
(Engelstad 2009). In addition, they operate to make major choices of political 
leaders when it is necessary to do so, and they provide peaceful means by 
which incompetent or unworthy leaders may be removed (Schumpeter 1942; 
Przeworski 1999).
The next question is whether elites will be able to do this. Is it possible to 
find ways in which the making of most day-to-day decisions will continue to 
be mainly in elite hands and yet be generally acceptable to salient insiders? 
In earlier societies bureaucratic and service personnel (or insiders) were 
managed by elites because they were willing to trust elite decision-making 
to serve their own interests. Most fundamentally, this earlier inclination to 
trust elites rested on the self-confidence that most bureaucratic and service 
personnel had. Typically, those who complained about decisions or sought to 
restrain elite decision-making were thought to reveal their own insecurity or 
weakness, and it was usually quite inexpedient to be perceived in this way. 
In earlier societies, too, bureaucratic and service positions and statuses were 
justified in terms of what could plausibly be viewed as ‘merit’, even if the 
formal organizational procedures connoted by this term were not always 
present. Those who did non-manual work were mainly persons who were 
convinced of their own qualifications for the positions they held or to which 
they aspired, even in the face of serious competition by others. Although they 
feared that favoritism might sometimes lead to the advancement of the wrong 
persons, by and large they counted on their own qualifications to impress 
superiors with the need to employ them suitably according to organizational 
needs. In this posture, they had no serious distrust of elite decision-making 
per se. It was all the easier to take this posture because it was readily 
apparent that the number of persons qualified and available for responsible 
organizational positions was quite limited. Only a small proportion of non-
elites had opportunities to acquire the verbal skills, personal demeanors, and 
rudimentary formal educations needed for such positions. Indeed, to be in 
non-manual employment at all (presuming that one had to work for a living) 
was a substantial indicator of qualifications that elite decision-makers could 
not easily disregard. 
Obviously, the situation is quite different in postindustrial societies. For 
most bureaucratic and service positions, especially those in which persons 
are employed initially, the qualifications needed are not specific or technical. 
They consist of linguistic and social skills and a broad acquaintance with 
social structure. Most children and youth who grow up in ‘cultivated leisure’ 
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acquire such skills and social knowledge. Moreover, post-secondary education 
is readily available to a much larger proportion of non-elites – nowadays 
more than half of young adult age cohorts – than was ever the case in the past. 
Indeed, in most postindustrial societies opportunities for higher education 
have increased more rapidly than have the available positions to which this 
education supposedly leads. The result is that many non-manual personnel 
are not confident that their qualifications for the positions they hold or seek 
will impress and persuade remote elite decision-makers to employ, retain, or 
advance them. They are uncomfortably aware that a great many other persons 
have similar or identical qualifications. 
This is the basic source of pressures to formalize decision-making 
processes in postindustrial work organizations. Insecure insiders are trying, 
quite rationally, to defend the positions they hold or seek on the basis of 
qualifications in which they have little confidence. Consequently, they try to 
impose procedural safeguards against arbitrary, and from their standpoints, 
uninformed decisions that affect their careers. They demand greater 
participation in the processes leading to these decisions, partly to present 
their credentials in the best possible light, and partly to prevent decisions 
that might go against them. Indeed, they demand the right to appeal decisions 
unfavorable to them. Given the large numbers of people competing for insider 
positions, the relative uniformity of their qualifications, and the remorseless 
insistence on ‘merit’ (in the sense of measurable indicators), it is plausible 
to think that the pressures to formalize decision processes will increase 
indefinitely in postindustrial societies. Yet beyond some point this is likely to 
result in paralysis and accompanying societal setbacks. 
It is idle to believe that these tensions and conflicts have some simple 
solution. If pressures from insiders for procedural safeguards and openness in 
organizational decisions are to be kept to a manageable level, much respect for 
acquired rights and statuses will have to be given. More specifically, the price 
of continued elite autonomy and latitude in decision-making will be accepting 
the acquired rights of employees located in a work organization’s more 
responsible and visible positions. These acquired rights include having a say 
in the organization’s decision processes and being able to count on receiving 
preference over candidates from outside the organization for advancements 
to higher positions. Only by emphasizing such ‘rights of possession’ at the 
expense of ostensible ‘meritocracy’ and ‘democracy’ can the insecurities of 
insiders be abated. 
In the longer run more problematic remedies might become feasible. For 
example, currently widespread opportunities for higher education might be 
reduced, or specialized and high prestige schools, akin to France’s grandes 
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écoles, might be superimposed on universities so that the number of persons 
formally qualified for middle- and higher-level organizational positions 
will more nearly approximate the number of positions actually available. 
Conceivably, the whole question of how children in affluent families grow 
up might be tackled. But all remedies will necessarily be compromises. Elites 
will lose more of their decision-making autonomy and latitude, although they 
may be able to retain enough to avoid organizational paralysis and its dire 
consequences. 
RELATIONS BETWEEN ELITES AND OUTSIDERS
Outsiders are all those adults in postindustrial societies who are more or less 
unemployable for objective or subjective reasons, plus those who do not have 
accepted and honorific statuses of dependency on the working population. 
Instead of being relegated to beggary or starvation, most of these outsiders 
are reluctantly and grudgingly accorded some public support. This was 
especially so during the initial experience with postindustrial conditions when 
there rather suddenly appeared to be no serious need for additional persons 
in the workforce. High economic productivity, in which vast quantities of 
goods were being produced on the basis of ever smaller direct applications of 
human labor, was evident. An unprecedented quantity of manufactured goods 
was being turned out by 30-40 percent of the workforce, employed mainly in 
factories at what by historic standards were short work hours in reasonably 
clean and safe workplaces. Foodstuffs and other agricultural needs were being 
fully satisfied by farmers who made up as little as 10 and then 5 and then little 
more than 2 percent of the workforce. In general, the material productivity 
that flowed from the direct efforts of about half the workforce was more than 
sufficient to absorb all the monies that consumers could be induced to spend 
on material goods. While this created much work for specialists in advertising, 
there was hardly a need for many more factory workers and farmers. 
The other half of a postindustrial work force – minus 10 percent initially 
but plus 20-25 percent after a generation or two – is employed at tasks 
whose products, although very important, are essentially intangible and not 
convincingly measurable. No one really knows with any certainty whether 
more of these kinds of workers are needed. For example, no one knows 
with any certainty if more teachers or more policemen or more accountants 
would actually produce more of whatever it is that teachers or policemen or 
accountants produce. Possibly more would produce less, but no one can really 
say. Much turns on the inclination of children to be taught, the disinclination 
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of persons to obey laws, or the willingness of those who spend organizational 
or public funds to report data for accountants to analyze. Obviously, white-
collar personnel interact with each other in complicated ways, and in many 
situations it is simply not clear if more of them are needed to do necessary 
non-manual work, the definition of which is itself unclear, or if some new plan 
of operation might be devised to reduce the amount of work that apparently 
needs to be done. What is clear is that in most of these settings, as with factory 
workers and farmers, there is no pressing need for a great many more white-
collar personnel (Higley – Burton 1999).
These considerations mean that there is little inclination and capacity to find 
alternative work for persons unable or reluctant to perform whatever work is 
actually available. This led many in the student movements of the 1960s and 
1970s to conclude that postindustrial societies are affluent and productive 
enough to render work strictly optional. Observing that there were enough 
persons working at necessary tasks to support all of the population at a high 
standard of living, many students inferred that if persons like themselves were 
not sufficiently attracted to any available work to want to pay the costs of 
qualifying to perform it, then let them paint pictures, sing songs, or raise 
babies at public expense. 
Unfortunately for this easy way out, however, affluence in postindustrial 
societies is not the objective fact that it appeared to be when the attention of 
leisured young people was first drawn to it. Probably few working adults feel 
really affluent. Outsiders located at or beyond the fringes of the employed 
workforce are seriously deprived according to the prevailing standard of 
living. Yet there is no way in which support for them can be generally, or 
at least handsomely, increased without a serious sacrifice on the part of the 
many insiders who by no means regard themselves as affluent. This is why 
efforts to increase support for deprived outsiders during the 1960s and 1970s 
triggered taxpayer revolts and, eventually, vehement assaults on the welfare 
state by doctrinaire laissez-faire leaders and parties. Moreover, the possibility 
of improving the lot of disadvantaged outsiders through a redistribution 
of income is impeded by the lack of empathy between insiders who work 
regularly or receive fairly generous support due to their dependency statuses 
and outsiders who do not work regularly or do not receive much or any support 
as dependents. The inevitable difference of outlook between the two non-elite 
camps leads to the insider’s question, ‘Why should I sacrifice to help them?’
This means that the outsider camp cannot be made to disappear, short of 
drastic reductions in the sizes of postindustrial populations, such as disease 
pandemics or environmental disasters might cause. In the absence of such 
calamities, and assuming that further declines in the size of workforces relative 
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to populations will occur as a result of new technological developments, such 
as wholesale computerization is already bringing about, the outsider camp 
will grow in size. What will the likely consequences be?
Probably growth of the outsider camp will threaten already fragile and 
tenuous mechanisms of social control in postindustrial societies. A far 
greater proportion of non-elites in postindustrial conditions escape the more 
convincing forms of social control than in past societies. Even though it is no 
longer strictly true, suppose that agricultural and manual industrial workers 
continue to produce material goods in ways that their fellow workers can 
directly observe, so that it is possible to tell whether a worker is loafing or not. 
It is, by contrast, much more difficult for most non-manual personnel to be 
similarly aware of whether their fellow workers are producing much or little. 
The policeman, for example, is present as much to discourage the commission 
of offenses as to arrest actual offenders. The accountant or auditor exists as 
much to discourage persons from misusing or embezzling funds as to detect 
and report the misuses and embezzlements that nonetheless occur. A manager 
with line authority is empowered to dismiss an employee who draws his or 
her pay and openly does not work. But open miscreants are few in number, 
and perhaps it is to personify the theoretical possibility of dismissal that is the 
main work such a manager performs. In short, non-manual work often has as 
its major purpose forestalling what might otherwise happen. 
The productivity of much non-manual work is in this respect essentially 
un-measurable. Its productivity can only be imagined in terms of postulates 
about what might happen in its absence. How many children would learn 
arithmetic if there were no teachers regularly employed to teach them? Some 
certainly would. How many emotionally distraught persons would eventually 
work out their problems if there were no psychologists and psychiatrists and 
therapists to help them do so? Certainly some would. The questions that have 
to be asked in order to try to measure the productivity of much non-manual 
work are inherently without definite answers. Any answer depends on too 
many un-specifiable matters. 
In postindustrial societies, therefore, a very large part of the workforce 
cannot be held to any convincing standard of work accomplishment. This 
is even truer, obviously, of the large body of dependents that postindustrial 
affluence makes possible. Almost the whole body of non-adults, a declining 
proportion of married women, and a large and increasing number of retired 
persons are in dependency statuses involving very little measurable work. If, 
in the extreme, all these dependents are taken together with all non-manual 
workers, probably three quarters of postindustrial populations, as distinct from 
workforces, escape the historically normal requirement to satisfy themselves 
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and others that they are doing part of society’s necessary work. 
This is why social control mechanisms in postindustrial conditions are 
distinctly fragile and tenuous. It takes a great deal of political consensus, social 
empathy, and lack of seriously divisive grievances and discontents to keep 
the bulk of the population reasonably responsive to social needs. Moreover, 
as troubled industrial relations in all postindustrial societies indicate, it is 
difficult to keep the comparatively few who still perform regular, measurable, 
burdensome and difficult work sufficiently diligent to prevent a lapse from the 
high level of material productivity without which postindustrial populations 
in their current sizes could not exist. 
It is this precarious social control that further growth of the outsider camp 
threatens to disrupt. For there is nothing in the circumstances of outsiders, that 
inclines them to respect established definitions of moderate and responsible 
behavior. Having no stake in the existing social structure and small chance of 
obtaining one, outsiders can eke out acceptable standards of living only by 
tactics that amount to beggary or brigandage. Their demands are essentially 
non-negotiable because they have little or nothing to lose by pressing them 
in an unrestrained manner. And in pressing such demands the most important 
leverage that outsiders have is the threat to disrupt in fairly horrendous ways 
the already precarious social controls of the society that has placed them 
outside. Thus, if the numbers of outsiders grow appreciably further, it is hard 
to see how the performance of those doing necessary tasks can be continued, 
unless, of course, the outsiders are greatly stigmatized and repressed by force. 
In this context, it is relevant to note that at present 2.25 million persons, nearly 
all of whom can safely be classified as outsiders, are incarcerated in 5,000 
American prisons, and another 2 million are in the clutches of the American 
penal system so that their behavior is closely watched. It is not too much to 
say that continued growth of the outsider camp poses a basic threat to the 
maintenance of liberal and humane values in postindustrial societies.
Elites will have to devise policies that terminate the trend toward a still greater 
insider-outsider division among non-elites. But the room for compromise that 
is probably available with respect to relations between elites and insiders does 
not appear to be present as regards relations between insiders and outsiders 
and between elites and outsiders. One can only think of improbable and 
distinctly unsavory policies, such as using taxation and other measures to 
discourage procreation among more prosperous families in order to reduce 
the number of leisured young people who are ambivalent about pursuing adult 
careers that pinch their leisured activities. This might open up more work 
positions for disadvantaged youth and it might help restore the ambitious, 
upwardly mobile persons, familiar during socioeconomic development, 
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to numerical prominence in postindustrial societies. But short of this most 
unlikely expedient, it will be necessary to make the experiences of leisured 
young people more relevant to the needs of adult life. Possibly this can be 
done, to some extent, by involving them in meaningful civic activities such 
as organized efforts to protect and restore parts of the despoiled environment 
or, of course, conscription into the military or some other public service. It 
may also be possible to re-define some adult statuses in areas like community 
recreation, entertainment, and adult education to create publicly acceptable 
work roles for those who lack strong career ambitions. In addition, where 
outsiders have been assigned their locations on the basis of identifiable group 
characteristics like race, ethnicity or gender, and where they can plausibly 
claim to have suffered discrimination as a consequence, placing some of them 
deliberately in prestigious occupational positions may be helpful. This kind of 
‘affirmative action’ has been practiced with some success in the United States 
as regards African Americans and many women, and it is now appropriate 
in European societies with large Muslim and other immigrant communities. 
Finally, the problem of job insecurity can be reduced somewhat by defining 
honorific dependency statuses more broadly. Mandatory early retirement 
ages and elongating the time that students spend in schools and universities 
illustrate what might be done, though it must be admitted that under-funded 
pension systems and increasing costs of tertiary education are compelling 
later retirement ages and shorter periods of university study. 
While some of these palliatives might be feasible, most of them are widely 
viewed as undesirable ideologically and politically. To a considerable 
degree, therefore, their adoption would depend upon intellectual and political 
innovation by elites. Not only must the problem of the relation between insiders 
and outsiders be more clearly recognized, a distinctly less sentimental version 
of liberal doctrine than that which currently has a hold on elite thinking must 
be adumbrated (e.g. Higley 2009). It may fairly be asked if hard-pressed elites 
in postindustrial societies are in a position to undertake this innovation. But 
even if the answer is affirmative, a doctrinal revision of liberal ideas and 
values will not suffice to eliminate the problems discussed here. In the last 
analysis, substantial net population decline in postindustrial societies may be 
necessary. 
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